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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes new micro-foundations for theorizing about executive compensation, 
drawing on the behavioral economics literature and based on a more realistic set of 
behavioral assumptions than those which have typically been made by agency theorists.  We 
call these micro-foundations “behavioral agency theory”.  In contrast to the standard agency 
framework, which focuses on monitoring costs and incentive alignment, behavioral agency 
theory places agent performance at the center of the agency model, arguing that the interests 
of shareholders and their agents are most likely to be aligned if executives are motivated to 
perform to the best of their abilities.  We develop a line of argument first advanced by 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), and put the case for a more general reassessment of the 
behavioral assumptions underpinning agency theory.  A model of economic man predicated 
on bounded rationality is proposed, adopting Wiseman and Gomez-Meija’s assumptions 
about risk preferences, but incorporating new assumptions about time discounting, inequity 
aversion and the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  We argue that 
behavioral agency theory provides a better framework for theorizing about executive 
compensation, an enhanced theory of agent behavior and an improved platform for making 
recommendations about the design of executive compensation plans. 
Keywords: agency theory; behavioral theory; compensation, bonuses and benefits; 
motivation; top management teams 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory has been a major component of the economic theory of the firm since the 
publication of formative work by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972), Ross (1973)  and Jensen and Meckling (1976).   It has also become the dominant 
theoretical framework for academic research on executive compensation (Bratton, 2005).   
The literature on senior executive reward is now very extensive, drawing on a variety of 
scholarly traditions, including economics, law, organization studies, accounting and finance.  
In addition to the agency approach, theoretical frameworks include tournament theory 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981), human capital theory (Combs & Skills, 2003), the managerial-
power hypothesis (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002), institutional theory (Balkin, 2008), 
political theories (e.g., Ungson & Steers, 1984) and theories about fairness (e.g., Wade, 
O'Reilly & Pollock, 2006).  Literature reviews and summaries are provide by Gomez, Meija 
& Wiseman (1997), Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder (2007) and Gomez-Mejia, Berrone 
and Franco-Santos (2010: 117-140).  Denvers et al (2007) note that behavioral research is a 
relative new feature of the literature on senior executive reward.   
That agency theory has shortcomings has been apparent for some time.  Most notably, 
given Jensen’s role as a leading agency theorist, empirical work carried out by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) failed to establish a conclusive link between CEO pay and stock price 
performance1  Ten years later, in a meta-analysis of 137 empirical studies, Tosi, Werner, Katz 
and Gomez-Meija (2000) similarly found that incentive alignment as an explanatory agency 
construct for CEO pay was at best weakly supported by the evidence. More recently, 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) have argued, based on a review of US executive compensation 
data covering the period 1936 to 2005, that neither optimal contracting (agency theory) nor 
the managerial power hypothesis is fully consistent with the available evidence.  Roberts, 
another agency theorist, has commented that agency theory performed poorly during the 
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financial crisis and has reported various situations where strong incentives are evidently not 
optimal, as agency theory implies (Roberts, 2010).  These include when good measures of an 
agent’s effort or performance are not available, when multi-tasking is required, and when 
cooperation between different agents is necessary, all common situations where top 
management teams are concerned.  Roberts puts forward arguments in favor of implementing 
weak rather than strong incentives in such circumstances. 
This paper proposes a new version of agency theory which provides a better explanation 
of the connection between executive compensation, agent performance, firm performance and 
the interests of shareholders.  We call this “behavioral agency theory”, developing a line of 
argument first advanced by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), who proposed that the 
normal risk assumptions of agency theory should be varied to incorporate ideas from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  Sanders and Carpenter 
(2003) have subsequently adopted a behavioral agency perspective in their examination of 
stock repurchase programs and a summary of the literature using the behavioral agency 
framework is provided by Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009).  Rebitzer and Taylor 
(2011) provide a general examination of behavioral approaches to agency and labor markets 
in the 4th edition of Ashenfelter and Card’s influential handbook on labor economics. 
However, a settled theory and agreed terminology for the behavioral agency model does not 
yet exist.  In contrast to the standard agency framework, which focuses on monitoring costs 
and incentive alignment, behavioral agency theory places agent performance and work 
motivation at the center of the agency model, arguing that the interests of shareholders and 
their agents are most likely to be aligned if executives are motivated to perform to the best of 
their abilities, given the available opportunities.  Behavioral agency theory builds on four 
constructs which have been identified as key factors affecting behavior by behavioral 
economists (Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin, 2004).  These are: (1) loss aversion and 
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reference dependence; (2) preferences relating to risky and uncertain outcomes; (3) temporal 
discounting; and (4) fairness and inequity aversion.  It incorporate a theory (crowding out) 
relating to the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Frey & Jegen, 2001; 
Sliwka, 2007).  It also introduces goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1984, 1990) to the 
agency model, on the basis that it represents a pragmatic way of contracting between 
principal and agent. 
The paper proceeds as follows: it begins by describing agency theory’s main elements and 
underlying assumptions, before reviewing the limitations of positive agency theory as an 
explanation of the relationship between senior executives and shareholders, and 
reconceptualizing what is meant by economic man (i.e., homo economicus of neoclassical 
economics).  It continues with an explanation of the behavioral agency model, describing the 
main component systems and commenting in some detail on the significance of motivation, 
risk, time discounting, inequity aversion and goal setting.  It examines the relationship 
between job performance and firm performance, discusses ways in which behavioral agency 
theory departs from standard agency theory, and considers the implications of behavioral 
agency theory for compensation design, before concluding. 
 
POSITIVE AGENCY THEORY 
Positive agency theory2, the standard model of agency which we consider in this paper, 
has been extensively used as a basis for theoretical and empirical work by management 
scholars and organization theorists (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989), as well as being widely applied in 
examining research questions relating to executive compensation (e.g., Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 
1989).   It argues that the firm is a special case of the theory of agency, that a firm provides a 
nexus for a complex set of contracts, both written and unwritten, between various parties, and 
that agency costs are generated as a result of the different interests and contractual 
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arrangements between owners and top managers (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The underlying assumptions are that organizations are profit 
seeking, that agents are both rational and rent seeking, and that there is no non-pecuniary 
agent motivation3.  It is further assumed that principals are risk neutral, because they can 
balance their portfolios, that agents are risk averse, because the potential wealth effects of the 
employment relationship are significant, that an agent’s utility is positively contingent on 
pecuniary incentives and negatively contingent on effort, and that time preferences are 
calculated mathematically according to an exponential discount function (Jensen, 1998).  It is 
postulated that effort and motivation increase monotonically with additional reward4.  The 
pay-effort function is visualized as a straight line with a positive gradient proceeding from 
bottom left to top right.  
Efficiency is the main criterion for assessing the success or otherwise of programs under 
agency theory.  Agency theory focuses on the costs of the potential conflict of interest 
between principals and agents, referred to as “agency costs”.  Jensen and Meckling define 
agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures of the principal, the bonding 
expenditures of the agent, and the residual loss in welfare experienced by the principal as a 
result of the divergence of interests between the principal and the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  Jensen subsequently offers a broader definition, describing agency costs as “the sum 
of the costs of structuring, bonding and monitoring contracts between agents…[which]…also 
include the costs stemming from the fact that it does not pay to enforce all contracts 
perfectly” (Jensen, 1983: 331)5.  Agency costs are thus a special case of transaction costs (in 
a Coasian sense) in their internal (intra-firm) rather than external (intra-market) form.  
Positive agency theory proposes that principals can mitigate agency costs by establishing 
appropriate incentive contracts and by incurring monitoring costs.  This is formalized by 
Eisenhardt in two propositions - first, in respective of  incentives: “when the contract between 
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the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of 
the principal” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 60); secondly, in respect of monitoring: “when the principal 
has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of 
the principals” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 60). 
 
BEHAVIORAL AGENCY THEORY 
Behavioral agency theory argues that the model of economic man which forms the micro-
foundations of agency theory is too simplistic.  It proposes a reconceptualization, developing 
a new model which assumes bounded rationality6, recognizes the importance of agents’ 
human capital (taking this to be a function of ability and work motivation) and allows for 
departures from the rational choice model when it comes to loss, risk and uncertainty 
aversion, time discounting, inequity aversion and the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation.  It proposes that the standard agency theory model of man should be modified in 
a number of ways.  The first modification relates to agent performance and work motivation.  
Agency theory places less emphasis on the objective of motivating agents to perform to the 
best of their ability than it does on aligning the interests of agents and principals.  Leibenstein 
(1966) argues that, given the importance of what is now called human capital, motivation (in 
particular, intrinsic motivation) cannot be ignored in the economic calculus.  Pratt and 
Zeckhauser (1985) make the same case for agency theory.  Behavioral agency theory argues 
that maximizing agent performance should be a key objective of the principal-agent 
relationship and that the importance of the agent’s work motivation, including intrinsic 
motivation, should not be underestimated.  It challenges the idea that intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation are either independent or additive, arguing instead that contingent monetary 
rewards might actually cause a reduction in intrinsic motivation (see Deci & Ryan, 1985).  
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Frey and Jegen (2001), following a line of scholarly thinking that dates back to Lepper and 
Greene (1978), have described this phenomenon as “crowding-out”(see also Sliwka, 2007) . 
The second modification relates to risk and uncertainty7.  Behavioral agency theory 
assumes that senior executives are primarily loss averse and only secondarily risk averse 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  Gains and losses are calculated by each individual agent 
in relation to a reference point which he or she subjectively determines.  Risk preferences 
differ in gains and losses, resulting in an “S-shaped” value function, with losses looming 
larger than gains.  This means that, below a reference point, agents will be loss averse, 
resulting in an increase in his or her appetite to take short term risk.  Above the reference 
point agents will generally be risk averse, but decision weights will vary depending on 
subjective probability assessment; for example, small probabilities are over-weighted and 
large probabilities are under-weighted. 
The third modification relates to time preferences.  In behavioral agency theory it is 
assumed that agents discount time according to a hyperbolic discount function, rather than  
exponentially, as is the case with financial discounting (Ainslie, 1991; Ainslie & Haslam, 
1992).  This means that future rewards are heavily discounted and allows for the possibility 
of preference reversals. Actual average discount rates vary between individuals and must be 
determined empirically.  
The fourth modification relates to an agent’s perceptions of equitable compensation.  If 
agents feel that their inputs, the effort and skills which they put in to their work, are fairly and 
adequately rewarded by outputs, the tangible and intangible rewards from employment, then 
the agents will be happy in their work and motivated to continue to contribute at the same or 
at a higher level (Adams, 1965).  However, if the relationship between inputs and outputs is 
not proportionate, then an agent will become dissatisfied and hence demotivated.  In this 
model the agent’s equity benchmark is subjectively determined according to market norms 
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and personal referents.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999: 819) call this phenomenon “inequity 
aversion”.  As is the case with risk and time discounting, we anticipate that actual levels of 
inequity aversion will vary between individuals and must be determined empirically. 
Table 1 summarizes the assumptions about the characteristics of economic man which 
provide the foundations of agency theory and compares them with the way in which 
behavioral agency theory reconceptualizes the model.  An important early conclusion which 
can be drawn is that an agent’s perception of the (subjectively-calculated) value of an 
incentive award will typically be less than the award’s (objectively-calculated) economic 
value.  This clearly has implications for the way that incentive contracts are designed. 
 
 
 
 
Assessment Criteria and Unit of Analysis 
Behavioral agency theory proposes that it is necessary to use both effectiveness and 
efficiency as yardsticks for judging agent activity.  By adopting effectiveness as well as 
efficiency as criteria for assessment we follow a long line of management theorists dating 
back to Barnard (1938 |1968)8.  Simon (1945 |1997) pointed out that the terms 
“effectiveness” and “efficiency” were considered to be almost synonymous until the end of 
the 19th century and were generally thought to mean the power to accomplish the purpose 
intended; however, the meanings of the two words subsequently diverged.  Efficiency came 
to be defined, firstly in engineering and subsequently in economics, business, and 
management, in terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs.  In this paper we use 
the terms efficiency and effectiveness in the following way: on the one hand, an action, event, 
plan, policy or program is considered to be efficient if it causes inputs to be minimized for a 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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given set of outputs or outputs maximized for a given set of inputs; on the other hand, an 
action, event, plan, policy or program is considered to be effective if it is capable of achieving 
its intended objectives, what the objectives are being exogenous to the theory.  We contend 
that it is necessary for management scholars to adopt both criteria in order to provide a 
complete and accurate evaluation of management policies, plans and programs.  Taking 
executive compensation as an example, a compensation plan might be effective and efficient 
(i.e., achieve its objectives of motivating top managers and aligning the interests of managers 
and shareholders, doing so in such a way that costs are minimized), effective but not efficient 
(i.e., achieve its objectives but in a way that is more costly than necessary), or neither 
effective nor efficient (i.e., fail to achieve its objectives at the same time as being costly).  
However, we argue that it makes no sense to describe a management plan or program as 
efficient but not effective.  The concept of effectiveness is already implied by the concept of 
efficiency; a lower cost (or indeed no cost at all) could otherwise be incurred while still 
failing to achieve the desired objectives. 
An important premise of behavioral agency theory, consistent with the top management 
team or “upper echelons” approach (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) is that senior executive teams 
have a major impact on firm performance.  We define “top management team” (and hence 
“top manager”) as the group of very senior executives who are responsible for defining and 
executing a firm’s strategy, who through their actions are capable of affecting the company’s 
profits, share price, reputation and market positioning (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 
2004).  This group, which includes the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief operating 
officer (COO), the chief financial officer (CFO), divisional heads and other heads of function, 
is sometimes referred to as the “management board”,  “operating board “, “executive 
committee” or “general management committee”. Changing trends in corporate governance 
mean that, while historically these individuals would have been executive directors, it is 
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increasingly common in many countries to find only the CEO and CFO on the main board, 
while all the key senior executives sit on the executive committee, or equivalent (Pepper, 
2006).   By defining top managers in this way, this part of behavioral agency theory becomes, 
in a sense, tautological (corporate performance is, in part, a function of the performance of 
top managers; top managers are those individual agents who are able to influence corporate 
performance).  However, this is the type of “useful tautology” which Jensen (1983: 330-331) 
points out is a necessary part of the process of theory development; nor does its inclusion in 
behavioral agency theory mean that this part of the theory becomes in practice irrefutable - it 
might be demonstrated in certain cases that top managers are not in practice able to have a 
significant impact on firm performance. 
Unlike upper echelons theory, which takes the top management team as the primary unit 
of analysis (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) behavioral agency theory focuses on the behaviors, 
interests and actions of individual top managers or agents.  Following Boxall and Purcell 
(2003) we model an agent’s performance as a manager of a large firm as a function of his or 
her ability, motivation and opportunity.  Agents will perform if they have the ability (the 
necessary knowledge, skill and aptitude), the motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic), and the 
right opportunities (including the necessary work structures and business environment); 
formally: 
Pā= f (A, M, O)       (1) 
where Pā  stands for the job performance of the agent, A stands for ability, M stands for 
motivation or “motivational force”, after Lewin (1938), and O stands for the agent’s 
opportunity set. 
Boxall and Purcell conceptualize ability in much the same way that Becker (1993) 
conceptualizes human capital, i.e., in terms of knowledge, skills, health, value and habits.  
Leibenstein (1966) comments on the importance of motivation to human capital. The 
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significance for behavioral agency theory is that a competent agent must be properly 
motivated in order to ensure optimal performance (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985), meaning in 
this context the point where efficiency is maximized subject to any effectiveness constraints, 
and effectiveness is maximized subject to any efficiency constraints.  Thus we define human 
capital in this article as “motivated ability” rather than merely as a function of education and 
experience. 
In this paper we focus on the role of motivation in influencing the job performance of 
agents. For the purposes of the current paper, we take  ability, which has its roots in the 
learning and development and human capital literatures, and opportunity, which can be traced 
to the leadership and strategy literatures, as given. 
 
Motivation 
The theory of work motivation most commonly used in investigations into the 
motivational impact of pecuniary incentives is expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964).  According 
to expectancy theory, motivational force is a function of expectancy (the strength of belief or 
subjective probability that an action i will lead to a particular outcome j), instrumentality (the 
degree to which a first outcome j will lead to a second outcome k), and valence (the 
preference which an individual has for the second outcome k)9.  Expectancy theory is 
essentially concerned with extrinsic, rather than intrinsic or total motivation.  Thus 
expectancy theory can be formally represented as:  
Xi = f (Eij, Ijk, Vk)     (2) 
where Xi is the extrinsic motivational force to perform act i, Eij is the strength of expectancy 
that act i will be followed by outcome j, Ijk is the instrumentality of outcome j for attaining 
outcome k, and Vk is the valence of outcome k.  Expectancy theory thus describes a cognitive 
process and is distinct from many of the other standard theories of motivation, especially 
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theories based on needs, drives and learned behaviors, which seek to explain the 
psychological content of motivation  
Steel and König (2006) have proposed a modified version of expectancy theory which 
they call “temporal motivation theory”.  It postulates that motivation can be understood in 
terms of valence and expectancy10, weakened by delay, influenced by risk and uncertainty, 
with different valences for gains and perceived losses. Temporal motivation theory brings 
expectancy theory together with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) and hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1991; Ainslie & Haslam, 1992).  
Reducing Steel and König’s formula down to its minimal form gives: 
where Xi is again the extrinsic motivational force to perform act i, Eikpt  is the expectancy that 
act i will lead, via j, to outcome k, Vkpt  is the valence for outcome k, δ is the personal 
discount factor for the delay between act i and outcome k, and t represents the time-lag.  
Expectancy and valence are both calculated in accordance with prospect theory.  The main 
implications of this are that probabilities and decision weights are determined subjectively 
and valence is affected by risk perception: in particular, valences will differ significantly 
depending on whether gains or losses are expected11.  Time effects are determined by a 
hyperbolic discount function after Ainslie (1991) rather than the more conventional 
exponential discounting function used in financial theory.  This means that, in Steel and 
König’s revised expectancy model, the valence which an agent attaches to k takes into 
account risk and uncertainty, as well as being discounted for any time delay between the 
occurrence of act i and outcome k.  
Positive agency theory places less emphasis on the objective of motivating agents than it 
does on alignment of the interests of agents and principals.  Deci and Ryan (1985) point out 
that there are two distinct forms of motivation, intrinsic motivation, where an agent performs 
Xi = { Eik
pt x Vkpt } (3)1+ δt 
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an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than because of some separable consequence, 
and extrinsic motivation, where an activity is carried out because of its instrumental value.  
Kreps (1997) argues that it is not necessary to postulate the concept of intrinsic motivation on 
the basis that what is called intrinsic motivation may in fact be no more than a series of 
vaguely defined extrinsic motivators.  Besley and Ghatak  (2005) contend, on the contrary, 
that there is such a thing as a motivated agent whose economic behavior is affected by 
intrinsic motivation, but their argument is directed towards employees of public sector or 
non-profit organizations whose activities coalesce around a “mission”.  Deci and Ryan (1985) 
argue that the importance of intrinsic motivation should not be underestimated.  They 
challenge the idea that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are either independent or additive, 
arguing instead that contingent monetary awards might actually cause a reduction in intrinsic 
motivation.  Boivie, Lange, McDonald and Westphal (2011) point out how, in the case of 
CEOs, high organizational identification, which may be associated with intrinsic motivation, 
can help to reduce agency costs.  Frey and Jegen (2001) and Sliwka (2007) postulate that in 
some cases extrinsic rewards can “crowd-out” intrinsic motivation, particularly if monetary 
incentives are badly designed.  They argue for a strong form of crowding-out whereby an 
increase in extrinsic reward leads to an overall reduction in total motivation.  A weaker form 
of crowding-out, whereby the level of total motivation is maintained only if the increase in 
extrinsic reward more than compensates for the reduction in intrinsic motivation, can 
alternatively be postulated.     
Following Deci and Ryan, (1985), the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation can be stated formally as follows: 
Mi = f (Ni, Xi)       (4) 
where Mi is an agent’s total motivational force, Ni is the agent’s intrinsic motivation, and Xi is 
the agent’s extrinsic motivation.  Mi, Ni, and Xi can be thought of in terms of stimuli, actions 
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or outcomes i.e., Mi represents motivation resulting from i, where i is a stimulus or bundle of 
stimuli, an action or package of actions, an outcome or collection of outcomes.  However, the 
relationship between Ni and Xi is neither linear nor additive (Deci & Ryan, 1985).  In a 
dynamic sense, when changes in incentives occur, there is evidently a trade-off of some kind 
between the two types of motivation.  Whether this is more accurately described by the strong 
crowding-out conjecture, where a change in extrinsic motivation as earnings increase from e 
to g, (+ΔXeg) leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation (-ΔNeg) such that ΔNeg > ΔXeg and   
Me  > Mg, or by the weak crowding-out conjecture, such that  ΔNeg =  ΔXeg and Me = Mg, can 
only be determined empirically.  This argument leads to the first two research propositions: 
Proposition 1a: (The weak crowding-out conjecture) Above a certain level of 
compensation (represented by inflection point λ1 on the agent’s pay-effort curve) 
intrinsic motivation will decrease as compensation increases, such that the rate of 
increase of total motivation will diminish and will eventually, at a higher level of 
compensation (represented by inflection point β on the agent’s pay-effort curve), 
reach zero. 
Proposition 1b: (The strong crowding-out conjecture) If compensation continues to 
increase above the higher level of compensation represented by inflection point β on 
the agent’s pay-effort curve, then total motivation will start to decline as intrinsic 
motivation is crowded out by extrinsic rewards.   
Compensation comprises the sum of all incentives and rewards, pecuniary and non-
pecuniary, arising from the agency relationship.  The difference between incentives and 
rewards is that incentives are determined ex ante (i.e., prior to performance, thus encouraging 
agents to act in a particular way) whereas rewards are determined ex post. 
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Risk 
A standard assumption of agency theory is that agents are risk averse.  According to 
behavioral agency theory this is an oversimplification.  We argue that extrinsic motivation 
and agent behavior are significantly affected by the agent’s risk profile and that a more 
sophisticated model of risk and uncertainty is accordingly required.  Behavioral agency 
theory postulates, after Wiseman and Gomez-Meija (1998), who in turn cite Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), that agents are primarily loss averse and 
consequently, contrary to one of the standard assumptions of agency theory, may actually 
have a high propensity to take short term risks below a certain level of compensation 
representing the point where perceived gains become perceived losses.  Above this gain/loss 
inflection point, agents will generally be risk averse, but small probabilities are typically 
over-weighted and large probabilities are typically under-weighted. The gain/loss inflection 
point is itself context dependent and a matter of individual differences.  In particular it is 
contingent upon the agent’s perception of his or her individual compensation endowment 
which comprises their actual current compensation, enhanced to the extent of future 
incentives which are expected to be received with a reasonable degree of certainty.  For 
example, a future bonus which is guaranteed or otherwise strongly anticipated based, say, on 
the pattern of past bonus payments, would be taken into account in the current compensation 
endowment, albeit discounted for future payment.  In a similar way, an agent with underwater 
options (where the current stock price is below the option strike price) may regard this as 
representing a loss on his or her current compensation endowment. 
This enables us to advance, following Wiseman and Gomez-Meija (1998), two further 
propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Below a level of compensation (represented by inflection point λ2 on 
the agent’s pay-effort curve) agents are loss averse. 
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Proposition 2b: Above a level of compensation (represented by inflection point λ2 on 
the agent’s pay-effort curve) agents are risk averse. 
 
Time Discounting 
Positive agency theory assumes that time differences can be accounted for by the type of 
conventional exponential discount function used in finance theory.  However, behavioral 
economists have identified a series of anomalies in the way that individuals account for time, 
including preference reversal and weakness of will (undertaking actions which in the short 
term are pleasurable, but which agents know to be detrimental to their well-being in the long 
term).  Ainslie (1991) explains these anomalies by arguing, based on experimental evidence, 
that his subjects discount future events hyperbolically so that the implied discount rate varies 
over time, rather than exponentially, which would require a constant discount rate.  That 
economic agents typically discount time hyperbolically is generally accepted as the norm by 
behavioral economists (Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2002; Graves & Ringuest, 
2012).  Steel and König (2006) argue that expectancy theory must take into account time 
differences as compensation (outcome k in Equation 3 above) may not be received until 
sometime after the action which leads to the payment (act i).  They also argue that time 
differences should be accounted for using a hyperbolic discount function.  Accordingly, we 
postulate that an agent’s extrinsic motivation is affected by time discounting, calculated on a 
hyperbolic discount basis, as set out in the next proposition: 
Proposition 3:  Agents discount future compensation according to a hyperbolic 
discount factor such that the average discount rate δ is significantly greater than the 
equivalent financial discount rate. 
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Inequity Aversion 
Behavioral agency theory postulates that motivational force is affected by inequity 
aversion, based on equity theory (Adams, 1965).  It is widely recognized that an individual’s 
satisfaction with his or her compensation depends not just upon buying-power, but also on 
how their compensation compares with the total rewards of salient others (Shafir, Diamond & 
Tversky, 1997).  Akerlof (1982) postulates the fair-wage hypothesis according to which 
workers have a conception of a “fair-wage” such that, if actual earnings are less than the fair-
wage, then only a corresponding fraction of normal effort will be supplied.  According to 
Adams (1965) people seek a fair balance between what they put into their jobs (including 
energy, commitment, intelligence and skill – collectively “inputs”) and what they get out 
(including financial rewards, recognition, and opportunities for personal growth – collectively 
“outputs”).  Agents form perceptions of what constitutes an appropriate balance between 
inputs and outputs by comparing their own situations with those of other people in 
accordance with the ratio {Oā/Iā} : {Or/Ir} (which we refer to below as the “Adams’ ratio”) 
where Oā is the agent’s outputs e.g., their compensation, Iā is the agent’s inputs e.g., their 
skills and effort, Or is the outputs of the agent’s referents and Ir is the referents’ inputs.  
Referents may be internal (peers, immediate subordinates, immediate superiors) or external 
(people doing equivalent jobs in other organizations). If agents feel that their inputs are fairly 
and adequately rewarded by outputs, the equity benchmark being subjectively perceived from 
market norms and other reference points, then they will be happy in their work and motivated 
to keep contributing at the same or a higher level.  However, if the relationship between 
inputs and outputs is not proportionate, such that {Oā/Iā} < {Or/Ir}, then the agent will 
become dissatisfied and hence demotivated.  “Inequity aversion”, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999: 
819) call this phenomenon,  is translated by Michelman into economic terms as 
“demoralization costs” (Michelman, 1967: 1214).  Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) argue 
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that inequity aversion applies equally to senior executives as to other workers.   Accordingly, 
we generate the next proposition: 
Proposition 4: Individual agents will determine a level of compensation (represented 
by inflection point λ3 on the agent’s pay-effort curve) by reference to the compensation 
of a class of significant referents, such that the agent will tend to be dissatisfied and 
hence demotivated if his or her actual earnings are less than λ3. 
It is important to note for Proposition 4 that an individual agent’s assessment of relative 
compensation levels will take account of his or her perception of their contribution in 
comparison with that of his or her referents, in accordance with what we have described 
above as the “Adams’ ratio”, according to which individuals seek to balance perceived 
relative inputs and outputs (Adams, 1965).  
 
Goal Setting, Contracting and Monitoring 
We turn now to goal setting, contracting and monitoring.  We argue that these activities 
should be seen as integral to behavioral agency theory: goal setting and monitoring are 
important factors in legal contracting, which is a key element in the relationship between 
principal and agent (Grossman & Hart, 1983; Hart, 1995); they have also been demonstrated 
to be an important component of agent motivation (Locke & Latham, 1984, 1990). Goal 
setting theory postulates a strong connection between goals, commitment and performance.  
Goals must be specific, difficult, attainable, and self-set or explicitly agreed to for the 
motivational affect to be maximized.  Much of the empirical work supporting goal setting 
theory has been carried out in an industrial context (e.g., with loggers, truck drivers and word 
processing operators).  Nevertheless, behavioral agency theory postulates that many of the 
features of goal setting theory are generalizable to senior executives.  Locke and Latham 
(2002) make three points which are particularly pertinent to agency relationships.  First, they 
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argue that monetary incentives enhance goal commitment but have no substantive effect on 
motivation unless linked to goal setting and achievement.  Secondly, they explain, through a 
model which they call the “high performance cycle”, how goal setting and achievement 
together lead to high performance, in turn leading to rewards, high job-satisfaction and self-
efficacy.  Thirdly, they suggest a possible connection with prospect theory, both theories 
stressing the importance of reference points in cognition. 
One of the main problems with the relationship between principals and agents which has 
been identified by agency theorists is that agency contracts are inevitably incomplete 
(Grossman & Hart, 1983; Hart, 1995).  If principals were able to specify completely all that 
they required of their agents, then there might be no need for incentive contracts to align the 
interests of principals and agents - monitoring of actions and outcomes might suffice.  
However, in practice there are limits on knowledge and cognition.  One of the reasons that 
principals employ agents is for the agents’ expertise.  An agent who is more knowledgeable 
about the matters which are to be specified in a contract may be able to second-guess the 
principal during and after contract negotiation to the agent’s advantage and the principal’s 
detriment. There are also dynamic constraints.  Over the course of time the business 
environment which provides the backdrop for the agency contract inevitably changes.  
Actions which are contractually required of the agent when a contract is negotiated may cease 
to be appropriate at a later date because of environmental changes, and other actions which 
could not have been anticipated ex ante may subsequently become necessary ex post.  It is 
contractual uncertainties of this kind that Roberts (2010) is referring to when he advocates the 
merits of weak rather than strong incentives in agency relationships.  Goal setting, especially 
when it involves discussions between principal and agent about the appropriate level of 
objectives, is a pragmatic way of contracting, given limits on knowledge and cognition.  It is 
also a signaling mechanism, indicating to one of the parties in an exchange relationship, the 
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agent, what is required by another party, the principal.  Spence (1973) has shown how 
signaling mechanisms of this kind form an important part of economic exchange in the 
context of employment.  Thus, goal setting, monitoring and reward, as part of a regular high 
performance management cycle, provide a way of improving the quality of contracting in a 
manner which helps to enhance rather than undermine agent motivation.  This leads to a 
further proposition: 
 Proposition 5a: The existence in a firm of a system of goal setting, monitoring, and 
linked rewards and incentives for agents who are members of the top management 
team is positively correlated with agent performance and work motivation.  
Some care is required, however.  First, it would not possible to specify in a performance 
contract a full set of the objectives which would be necessary to cover all possible situations 
that might arise during the course of a performance cycle.  According to the principle of 
requisite variety, a control system requires a response mechanism for every exogenous shock 
which it might face (Ross Ashby, 1956 |1976).  Top managers face great complexity in their 
work and it would not be possible to anticipate every possible exogenous shock in a 
performance contract, nor to specify fully all the requirements of the job (Mintzberg, 1997, 
2009).  Arrow (1985) notes how unrealistic such a complex fee function would be.  Secondly, 
the knowledge constraints of the bounded rationality assumption place cognitive limits on an 
agent’s ability to assimilate and understand complex goals and performance criteria.  This in 
turn leads to Proposition 5b, which is consistent with the conclusions reached by Roberts 
(2010), described in the introduction: 
Proposition 5b: Weak incentives are a more effective and efficient way of motivating 
agents than strong incentives. 
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Agent’s Job Performance and Work Motivation Cycle 
The various elements of the subsystem which models agent job performance and work 
motivation are summarized in Figure 1.  This figure illustrates the trade-off between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation (the subject of Propositions 1a and 1b), the roles played by risk 
(Propositions 2a and 2b), time discounting (Proposition 3) and inequity aversion (Proposition 
4).  The goal setting, contracting and monitoring process (Propositions 5a and 5b) are 
illustrated, along with the integral feedback mechanism.  Two further propositions, developed 
later in the paper, are also represented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our analysis of the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, risk, and 
inequity aversion we have identified three compensation inflection points on the agent’s pay-
effort curve: λ1 which is critical to the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation;   
λ2 which determines where an individual’s risk appetite changes from loss aversion to risk 
aversion; and λ3 which acts as the reference point for comparisons with salient others in the 
context of inequity aversion. As we have explained, λ1, λ2 and λ3 are critical points in the 
various sub-systems.  In our representation of an agent’s pay-effort function in Figure 2 we 
make the assumption that these three inflection points are identical for any one individual 
agent.  There is support for this assumption in the argument advanced by Deci and Ryan 
(1985) that the psychological sub-systems for intrinsic motivation, risk, and inequity aversion 
converge upon a common psychological state in which cognitive, affective and conative 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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variables are optimally aligned.  However, we assume the equality of the three inflection 
points largely for mathematical convenience.  In practice, even if there is a linear range 
between an upper inflection point (λ1) and a lower inflection point (λ2 and λ3), or a plane with 
three separate inflection points, the main argument, which is that there is a set of values for 
which an agent’s pay-effort ratio is optimized, would not be undermined - the range of 
possible outcomes would simply be expanded. 
Intrinsic motivation is represented in Figure 2 by the ε = f(Ni) curve and extrinsic 
motivation by the ε = f(Xi) curve.  By superimposing the extrinsic motivation curve on top of 
the intrinsic motivation curve, we generate the total motivation or ε = f(Ni, Xi) curve.   This 
runs parallel to the extrinsic motivation curve until total compensation reaches ω*, at which 
point crowding out sets in, intrinsic motivation starts to decline and the rate of increase of 
total motivation slows accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
  
By assuming the equality of λ1, λ2 and λ3 (i.e., λ) we infer that there is a preferred level of 
pay at which point the relationship between agent motivation (ε*) and total compensation 
(ω*) is optimized, subject to constraints for risk, time discounting and inequity aversion.  
This is the point when an agent’s effort-to-pay ratio is maximized, such that the gradient of 
the total motivation curve is equal to 1.   It implies that there is a set of first best 
compensation strategies, being combinations of fixed and variable pay, contingent and 
discretionary bonuses, and short-term and long term incentives: formally, that λ is represented 
by the set {σ1, σ2,…σn} where σ represents a compensation mix with a unique combination of 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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fixed, variable, contingent, discretionary, current and deferred rewards.   If in practice there 
was a linear range between an upper and lower inflection point, or a plane with three separate 
inflection points, then this would simply increase the set of first best pay combinations. Based 
on this analysis we advance the next proposition: 
Proposition 6: There is a set of first best compensation strategies combining fixed and 
variable pay, contingent and discretionary bonuses, and short-term and long term 
incentives, such that the relationship between pay and agent motivation is optimized. 
Figure 2 also illustrates a number of other phenomena: below point α motivation falls 
away rapidly as a result of inequity aversion – effort levels are only restored at point α when 
the Adams’ ratio recovers to an acceptable level; above point β crowding-out means that 
intrinsic motivation has more or less been eliminated entirely and total motivation has 
peaked.  If the strong crowding-out conjecture is correct, then at point γ the intrinsic 
motivation  curve moves from positive to negative and total motivation begins to decline.  
It is important to understand what this figure does and does not tell us about executive 
compensation.  In Figure 2, λ represents the point where total compensation, comprising fixed 
pay, incentives and rewards, is at its most efficient and effective, and an agent’s effort- to-pay 
ratio is at its highest.  The actual pay of senior executives, which is in practice influenced by 
other factors such as (often imperfect) labor market conditions, strategic (inter-firm) rivalry, 
and political (intra-firm) gaming, may in practice be higher.  Executives might be prepared to 
offer more effort for more incentive pay, but the marginal cost to the employing company of 
increasing incentive payments may be very high.  This is consistent with the phenomenon of 
high executive compensation (which may be effective but is not necessarily efficient) and 
also with proposition 5b, that weak incentives are a more effective and efficient way of 
motivating agents than strong incentives. 
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Corporate Performance 
A complete theory of agency must explain the mechanism which links the job 
performance of an executive with the performance of the firm.  We take as starting point 
upper echelons theory (Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984) which postulates a causal connection between business performance (the dependent 
variable), the cognitive skills of top managers, their observable personal characteristics (e.g., 
age, education, experience, socioeconomic background etc.), their strategic choices, and the 
objective situation (independent variables). We first simplify this a little by taking corporate 
financial performance to be a function of an agent’s performance (as described in the 
motivation cycle), the performance of other agents, and the external business environment.  
We then build on the upper echelons approach by postulating a link between the performance 
of an individual agent ā (itself a function of his or her ability, motivation and opportunity set), 
the performance of other agents ō who, together with agent ā, comprise the top management 
team, the business strategy (as devised and implemented by the top management team) and 
the business environment, on the one hand, and business performance on the other hand. 
The external business environment is largely outside the control of senior management 
and hence exogenous to behavioral agency theory. The job performance of other agents, Pō, is 
endogenous.  Indeed, the motivation and performance cycles described in this paper are 
replicated for all agents fitting the definition of top managers. This generates a final research 
proposition, that incentive compatibility between agents is a necessary condition of optimal 
corporate performance.  We articulate this as follows: 
Proposition 7: The incentives and rewards of individual agents must be compatible 
with the incentives and rewards of other agents working as part of the same top 
management team if firm performance is to be optimized. 
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It means, for example, that agents’ goals and performance conditions attaching to incentives 
must be compatible one with another.  It also requires inequity aversion to be taken into 
account within the top management team - there is a strong presumption that individual 
agents will regard other agents in the same top management team as among their pool of 
referents for the purposes of equity theory.  The desirability of compatible incentives is 
consistent with the argument that interventions may be necessary in order to align the interest 
of different members of top management groups (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 1994). 
The incentive compatibility proposition also provides a further argument in favor of weak 
rather than strong incentives.  Roberts (2010) notes that strong incentives may not be 
appropriate when cooperation between different agents in necessary.  Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen (1997) have pointed out that it is difficult to calibrate individual contributions to a 
joint effort and have commented that high-powered incentives might well be destructive of 
cooperative activity and learning. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In her assessment and review of agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) sets out the main 
elements of positive agency theory in a table.  We repeat this below in Table 2, adding a third 
column which identifies the areas where behavioral agency theory departs from the standard 
principal-agent model.  According to Eisenhardt the key idea of agency theory is that 
principal agent relationships should reflect the efficient organization of the costs of 
information and risk-bearing. The unit of analysis is the contract between principal and agent. 
The main assumptions are that executives are rational (but see footnote 3), self-interested and 
risk averse, that there is partial goal conflict between stakeholders, that information is 
incomplete and not equally shared, and that the overriding organizational objective is 
efficiency. The problems addressed by the theory involve moral hazard, adverse selection and 
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how best to share risk, especially where principals and agents have partially differing goals 
and risk preferences. Proposed solutions to the problems include monitoring through effective 
corporate governance and outcome-based incentive contracts.   
Behavioral agency theory departs from the positive agency framework in three main 
respects.  First, while positive agency theory focuses on the implications for the firm of costs 
which arise out of the principal-agent relationship, using efficiency as the main assessment 
criterion, behavioral agency theory focuses on the relationship between agency costs and 
performance, using efficiency and effectiveness as the yardsticks.  The objective of an agency 
contract is to optimize job performance given the constraints of agency costs.  This is 
achieved at the inflection point λ on the agent’s proforma pay-effort curve.  Secondly, while 
agency theory assumes that agents are rational, risk averse and rent seeking, and that there is 
no non-pecuniary agent motivation, behavioral agency theory proposes a more sophisticated 
model of man whereby agents are boundedly-rational, loss, risk and uncertainty averse, and 
where there is a trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  Thirdly, while agency 
theory assumes a linear relationship between pay and motivation, behavioral agency theory 
proposes a more complex pay-effort function which is affected by loss, risk and uncertainty 
aversion, the hyperbolic discounting of deferred rewards, inequity aversion, and the trade-off 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
 
 
 
 
Implications of Behavioral Agency Theory for the Design of Incentives 
Much of the current design thinking about executive compensation ignores behavioral 
issues and does not take account of agents’ preferences, instead falling into the trap of 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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institutional isomorphism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983), either in the name of “best practice” 
by following what other firms do (mimetic isomorphism), or by uncritically doing as 
regulators say (coercive isomorphism).  Behavioral agency theory goes against the current 
fashion, pointing instead to simpler, more balanced reward systems and more straightforward 
performance measures.  In particularly, contrary to the logic of agency theory, we argue that 
high powered incentives are not an efficient and effective way of motivating agents.  It is not 
possible to construct an incentive contract for an agent or set performance measures which 
incorporate all the principal’s current objectives and are flexible enough to deal with all 
possible exogenous shocks which might occur during the performance cycle.   Knowledge 
constraints resulting from an agent’s bounded rationality mean that designing very complex 
incentive contracts in order to tie the principal’s and agent’s interests as tightly as possible is 
likely to have an adverse effect of the agent’s job satisfaction and work motivation.  
Furthermore, at high levels of compensation, crowding-out means that intrinsic motivation 
which is forgone because of an increase in incentives can only be compensated for by 
proportionately greater increases in extrinsic rewards.  Finally, deferred pay, frequently 
advocated as a solution to the problem that high levels of executive compensation are seen to 
be undesirable as a matter of public policy, is in practice an expensive way of paying agents 
when seen in the context of agent motivation.  These arguments are consistent with the 
“strength of weak incentives” thesis, described above, as advocated by Roberts (2010).  They 
contradict the normative arguments of financial economists who advocate  the use of high-
powered incentives as a partial remedy for the agency problem (Jensen & Murphy, 1990); see 
also Bebchuk and Fried (2004: 72). 
We argue that, for any group of agents comprising a top management team, there is a 
balanced set of first best reward strategies, being combinations of fixed and variable pay, 
contingent and discretionary bonuses, and short and long-term incentives, which allow the 
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relationship between reward costs, agent motivation and job performance to be optimized.  In 
order to maximize firm performance the selected strategy must be compatible with the 
strategies selected for other agents in the principal’s top management team.  Identifying these 
reward strategies is not a simple matter, ideally requiring an understanding of individual 
differences between agents in terms of their tolerance of risk and inequity and in the way that 
they discount future rewards.  Partly as a result of the complexity involved in designing 
appropriately simple incentive and reward systems, ex post discretionary payments to agents 
may sometimes be warranted as partial gift exchanges in the expectation that they will result 
in reciprocal gifts of effort (Akerlof, 1982). 
 
Contribution 
Agency theory is a central component of the modern theory of the firm (Jensen, 2000; 
Roberts, 2004).  We have explained that the standard theory of agency has significant 
shortcomings, especially in its failure in practice to explain the relationship between 
executive compensation, agent behavior and firm performance.  While there is, after Cyert 
and March (1963 |1992), an extensive literature on the behavioral theory of the firm (see 
Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal & Ocasio, 2012), we do not yet have a satisfactory behavioral 
agency theory.  This paper takes a significant step in correcting this omission.  In particular, it 
advances a theory of behavioral agency which better explains the mechanisms which connect 
incentives, agent behavior, and the type of high performance outcomes which shareholders 
desire.  This is an important framework, especially for scholars studying executive 
compensation. 
Positive agency theory, like many theories which have their origins in neoclassical 
economics, aims to provide accurate predictions about economic phenomena without 
claiming that its foundational assumptions realistically describe the underlying behavioral 
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processes (see Friedman, 1953).  Wakker (2012), who in turn cites Harré (1970), calls this 
paramorphism.  This approach is self-evidently flawed when neither the predictions nor the 
underlying processes match reality.  Behavioral agency theory, on the other hand, aims to 
explain economic phenomena by reference to descriptions of underlying processes which do 
match reality. Wakker (2012) calls this homeomorphism. Behavioral economists argue that 
homeomorphism is more likely to generate useful explanations of actual economic 
phenomena and hence is a better approach to theory building. 
Part of the validity which we claim for behavioral agency theory is based on the way in 
which it adapts and integrates existing theory.  Steel and König have emphasized the 
importance of consilience in theory development, arguing that: “if a theory can be shown to 
have consilience, its scientific validity is vastly improved, since it represents different 
avenues of inquiry coming to similar conclusions” (Steel & Konig, 2006: 889).  A major 
contribution of this paper lies in the way in which it integrates a number of different 
literatures: in particular, the neoclassical economic theory of agency (after Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976); work motivation theory (for example Locke & Latham, 1984; Steel & 
Konig, 2006;  and Vroom, 1964); the literature on choices, values, heuristics and biases (after 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; and Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); and the upper echelons 
approach to strategic leadership (after Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Our paper also makes a 
contribution to the management literature by updating Eisenhardt’s (1989) review of agency 
theory for management scholars, incorporating new ideas from behavioral economics.  In 
addition, and significantly, the paper has important implications for practice in the way that it 
advocates the use of balanced executive reward strategies and weak incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
30
Conclusion 
Formally, behavioral agency theory comprises four inter-connected equations, two figures, 
ten propositions, and a supporting narrative.  Equation (1), after Boxall and Purcell (2003), 
connects an agent’s job performance with his or her ability, motivation and opportunity set.  
Equation (2), after Vroom (1964), which is in turn modified by the inclusion of time 
discounting, risk and loss aversion to become Equation (3), after Steel and König (2006), 
explains the relationship between compensation and agent motivation.  Equation (4) 
distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and identifies a potential trade-off 
between the two.  Figure 1 explains the place of agent performance and work motivation in 
the firm’s performance cycle and Figure 2 illustrates an agent’s pay-effort curve. 
In this paper we have sought to provide a better understanding of the micro-foundations of 
agency theory, especially as it applies to executive compensation, based on a more realistic 
set of assumptions about agent behavior.  We hope that others will join us in further 
developing behavioral agency theory, in testing it empirically, and in identifying other 
implications for business practice.    
 
    (Jensen & Meckling, 1994)  (Savage, 1954)  (Foss, 2010)  (Simon, 1957 |1982)  
(Gabaix & Landier, 2008)  (Roberts, 2011) 
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 FOOTNOTES  
1 Some commentators (e.g., Roberts, 2011) imply that Jensen and Murphy’s empirical evidence is not contrary 
to agency theory, but suggests instead that it means the (normative) recommendations of agency theory have not 
been followed in practice.  An argument in this form, implying that the absence of two factors (incentive pay 
and high performance) can be interpreted as evidence of a causal connection between the two phenomena (so 
that more of the first factor will necessarily lead to more of the second) is hardly justified.  It also appears to 
confuse the positive theory of agency (which should be capable of explaining the world as it is) with normative 
theory.  In practice, as argued long ago by Herbert Simon in 1957 and demonstrated empirically by Gabaix and 
Landier in 2008, CEO pay is much more closely correlated with company size than company performance. 
2 Jensen (1983) identifies two different strands in the literature on agency theory.  He calls these the “positive 
theory of agency” and the “principal-agent” literature.  Eisenhardt (1989) describes the latter as a “general 
theory of the principal-agent relationship”, while Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998)  call it “normative agency 
theory”. Positive agency theory focuses on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners 
and managers of large corporations (Charreaux, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1983).  Normative agency 
theory aims to provide a formal theory of the principal-agent relationship in all its guises, including employer-
employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier etc., (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
3 Eisenhardt (1989) states that positive agency theory also assumes bounded rationality, but we can find no other 
reference to this in the agency theory literature.  After the first, formative papers on agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1994) later develop the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model of man (REMM) which they say 
is consistent with agency theory, but this is still a rational choice model. They subsequently develop a second 
framework, the pain avoidance model (PAM), but they do not seek to integrate this into agency theory. 
4 Christen et al., (2006) point out that motivation (wanting to work hard) is not the same as effort (working hard 
and, in doing so, expending time and energy).  However, in much the same way that revealed preference is a 
marker of mental preference, so effort can be thought of as a marker of motivated behavior (see Martin and 
Tesser, 2009).  This means that, in the absence of coercion, effort can be taken to imply the presence of 
motivation even if motivation does not necessarily result in the expenditure of effort.  
5 Jensen and Meckling do not explicitly mention expenditure on incentives and rewards, i.e., the actual cash 
costs of incentivizing and rewarding agents, although such expenditure would seem self-evidently to be part of 
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the cost of agency.  Incentive and reward costs can be further broken down into the costs of providing incentives 
and rewards in the optimal form and mix plus any additional costs incurred in incentivizing and rewarding 
agents in a way which is sub-optimal.  In order to be precise we use the following terminology in this article: 
total compensation or pay (ω) is the sum of fixed pay and variable pay; variable pay is itself the sum of 
incentives (awarded ex ante) and discretionary rewards (awarded ex post).  “Compensation” and “pay” are 
treated as synonyms.  Use of the sign “ω” follows the convention in labor economics of taking “ω” as the 
symbol for wages. 
6 There are many different definitions of “bounded rationality”.  We follow Williamson, who explains that 
rationality is subject to neuro-physiological rate and storage limits on the powers of agents to receive, store, 
retrieve, and process information without error (after Williamson, 1975, p.21).  Williamson also talks about a 
further element of bounded rationality, which he calls “language limits”, being the constraints on individuals to 
communicate comprehensively in such a way that they are fully understood by others, but this element is not 
really relevant to the current article. Foss (2010) provides an elegant summary description of bounded 
rationality, which he describes in terms of (1) limitations in the human capacity to process information; (2) 
attempts to economize on mental effort by relying on short-cuts or heuristics; and (3) a consequence of the fact 
that cognition and judgement are subject to a wide range of biases and errors.   
7 In this paper we largely ignore the Knightian distinction between risk (probabilistic outcomes) and uncertainty 
(indeterminate outcomes), instead treating “risk” and “uncertainty” as synonymous. 
8 Note however that Barnard used the term “efficiency” in an entirely different sense: to Barnard an organization 
is “efficient” if it satisfies the motives of its members. 
9 Expectancy, a measure of probability, takes values between 0 and +1.  Instrumentality takes values between +1 
(meaning it is believed that the first outcome will certainly lead to the second outcome) and -1 (meaning it is 
believed that the second outcome is impossible in the event of the first outcome). 
10 Temporal motivation theory combines expectancy and instrumentality into one operator, which Steel and 
Kӧnig call “expectancy” but which is essentially the same thing as subjective probability after Savage (1954).  
While this loses some of the richness of Vroom’s conceptualization of expectancy and instrumentality 
(especially the possibility that instrumentality may be negative) it is a pragmatic simplification of the theory and 
hence is followed here. 
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11 A more complex way of representing Steel and König’s motivation function, which distinguishes between 
gains and losses and hence accounts for loss aversion is: 
Xi =   Σ { Eik+ x Vk+ } - Σ { Eik- x Vk- } 1+ δ+t 1+ δ-t 
This expression of the formula explicitly recognizes that the expectancy, valence and the average discount factor 
will differ for gains (represented by +) and losses (represented by -). 
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TABLE 1: Assumptions about the Nature of Man under Positive Agency Theory and 
Behavioral Agency Theory 
Assumption Economic man Behavioral economic man 
Principal’s risk 
preference 
Principals are risk neutral As for agency theory 
Agent’s utility 
function 
Agents are rent seeking, 
agent’s utility is positively 
contingent on pecuniary 
incentives and negatively 
contingent on effort 
As for agency theory, but 
subject to constraints 
relating to rationality, 
motivation, loss, risk, 
uncertainty and time 
preferences 
Agent’s rationality Agents are rational Agents are boundedly rational, 
i.e., subject to neuro-
physiological rate and 
storage limits on the powers 
of agents to receive, store, 
retrieve, and process 
information without error  
Agent’s  motivation There is no non-pecuniary 
agent motivation 
Motivation is both intrinsic 
and extrinsic. Intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation are 
neither independent nor 
additive. 
Agent’s risk 
preference 
Agents are risk averse Agents are loss averse below a 
gain/loss inflection point; 
otherwise risk averse  
Agent’s time 
preferences 
Agents’ time preferences are 
calculated according to an 
exponential discount factor 
Agents’ time preferences are 
calculated according to a 
hyperbolic discount factor 
Agent’s preference 
for perceived 
equitable pay 
Not defined Agents are inequity averse 
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TABLE 2:  Overview of Positive Agency Theory vs. Behavioral Agency Theory 
 Positive agency theory  
(after Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Behavioral agency theory 
Key idea The primary importance of 
aligning the interests of 
principals and agents.  The 
principal-agent 
relationship should reflect 
efficient management of 
the costs of information 
and risk-bearing  
The primary importance of 
agent performance and 
work motivation.  The 
principal-agent 
relationship should reflect 
the efficient and effective 
management of the 
relationship between 
executive compensation, 
firm performance and 
shareholder interests  
Unit of analysis Contract between principal 
and agent  
Contract between principal 
and agent 
Human assumptions Agents are rational, self-
interested, risk averse 
Agents are boundedly 
rational, loss, risk and 
uncertainty averse, 
hyperbolic time 
discounters, inequity 
averse, and there is a 
trade-off between 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation 
Organizational assumption Partial goal conflict between 
principals and agents, 
efficiency as the main 
performance criterion, 
information asymmetry 
Partial goal conflict between 
principals and agents, 
efficiency and 
effectiveness as the main 
performance criterion, 
information asymmetry 
Information assumption Asymmetric information 
and incomplete 
contracting 
As for agency theory; goal 
setting used as a 
pragmatic solution to 
information asymmetry 
Primary factor(s) 
determining the 
principal-agent 
relationship 
The principal’s wish to align 
the agent’s objectives with 
the principal’s owns 
objectives (alignment) 
The principal’s wish to align 
the agent’s objectives 
with the principal’s own 
objectives (alignment) 
and to motivate agents to 
give high performance, 
given their abilities and 
opportunities (motivation)
Contracting problems Moral hazard and adverse 
selection  
As for agency theory 
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Key mechanisms Monitoring and incentive 
contracts 
As for agency theory, except 
that incentive contracts 
can also help to meet the 
motivation objective 
Problem domain Where principals and agents 
have different goals and 
risk preferences e.g., 
regulation, compensation, 
vertical integration, 
transfer pricing  
As for agency theory; 
especially relevant to 
executives and executive 
compensation 
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FIGURE 1  
Agent’s Job Performance and Work Motivation Cycle 
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